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TITLE IX: WHAT IS GENDER EQUITY?
GEORGE A. DAVIDSON*
CARLA A. KERR**
I. INTRODUCTIONIn the time since Congress enacted Tide IX in 1972,1 women's
sports programs developed from small, underfunded and nearly
invisible afterthoughts into large and vital components of athletics
programs at high schools and colleges. The participation rates of
women in varsity athletics more than doubled, 2 and at many institu-
tions the number of varsity sports offered for women approached,
reached or even exceeded the number offered for men.3
Last year, when colleges and universities finally began to credit
themselves for their hard work and investment in achieving a
higher level of participation by women despite an increasingly diffi-
cult economic environment,4 everything changed. Three federal
* Brown University A.B. 1964; Columbia University LL.B. 1967; Partner,
Hughes Hubbard & Reed, New York.
** Stanford University A.B. 1983; J.D. 1986; Associate, Hughes Hubbard &
Reed, New York.
1. Tide IX of the Education Amendments of 1972, 20 U.S.C. § 1681 et seg.,
amended by Section 908 of the United States Civil Rights Restoration Act of 1987.
2. 2 ROBERT C. BERRY & GLENN M. WONG, LAW & BusINESS OF THE SPORTS
INDUSTRIES: COMMON ISSUES IN AMATEUR & PROFESSIONAL SPORTS 211 (1986).
Prior to 1972, only 15% of collegiate athletes were women and only 5% of high
school athletes were women. By the mid-1980's, however, women represented
more than 30% of athletes at both the high school and college levels. William E.
Thro & Brian A. Snow, Cohen v. Brown University and the Future of Intercollgiate
and Interscholastic Athletics, 84 EDUC. L. REP. 611 (1993).
3. Parity in the numbers of men's and women's teams offered has occurred
on both the institutional and conference levels. Indeed, in June of 1993, the
Southeastern Conference (SEC) passed gender equity legislation requiring mem-
ber schools to provide two more women's sports than men's sports. Carol Herwig,
SEC Schools Seek Gender Equity By Adding Two Women's Sports, USA TODAY, June 4,
1993, at IC. See Favia v. Indiana Univ. of Pa., 7 F.3d 332, 335 (3d Cir. 1993)
("I.U.P. fielded nine male and nine female varsity athletic teams in intercollegiate
competition."); Cohen v. Brown Univ., 991 F.2d 888, 892 (1st Cir. 1993) ("Brown
fielded fifteen women's varsity teams - one fewer than the number of men's var-
sity teams."); OCR Letter of Finding University of Arkansas (1992) (offering seven
men's teams and six women's teams); OCR Letter of Finding Mercer University
(1991) (offering six men's teams and six women's teams); OCR Letter of Finding
Loyola College (1990) (offering seven men's teams and seven women's teams);
OCR Letter of Finding University of Nebraska (1989) (offering nine men's teams
and eight women's teams).
4. See, e.g., Cohen, 991 F.2d at 898 ("[I]n an era of fiscal austerity, few universi-
ties are prone to expand athletic opportunities."); Gonyo v. Drake Univ., 837 F.
Supp. 989, 992 (S.D. Iowa 1993) ("Cutting athletic budgets because of total school
(25)
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courts of appeals' decisions5 signaled a "monumental change"6 in
the interpretation of Title IX that put the varsity athletics programs
of virtually every college and university in violation of the law.
These three decisions interpreted Title IX to require that colleges
and universities provide varsity positions for male and female ath-
letes in proportion to the enrollment of male and female students
in the overall student body. Women currently comprise about 50%
of college students and 36% of college varsity athletes. 7
In this era of tight budgets, achieving a varsity participation
ratio that is proportionate to enrollment would require most insti-
tutions to eliminate men's teams and to create women's teams.
Male athletes affected by such cutbacks have objected that a propor-
tionality requirement would transform Title IX from a statute that
forbids discrimination to a statute that requires it. Male athletes
have argued that allocating 50% of college varsity slots to women
and the other 50% to male athletes is blatant sex discrimination
because women presently compose only 36% of varsity athletes
graduating from high school.8 Male athletes argue that to construe
parallel legislation prohibiting race discrimination as allocating var-
sity slots in proportion to the campus population of each race
would provoke outrage.9
As judicial interpretation of Title IX develops, the three deci-
sions may prove to be harbingers of a new understanding of Title
IX or they may prove to be missteps based on incomplete analyses
of sympathetic facts under the pressures of preliminary injunction
schedules.
The consequences of these recent decisions are not limited to
the playing field. Title IX does not specifically deal with athletics.10
budget constraints has been common throughout the United States in recent
years.").
5. Favia v. Indiana Univ. of Pa., 7 F.3d 332 (3d Cir. 1993); Roberts v. Colorado
State Bd. of Agric., 998 F.2d 824 (10th Cir.), cert. denied, 114 S. Ct. 580 (1993);
Cohen v. Brown Univ., 991 F.2d 888 (1st Cir. 1993).
6. Thro & Snow, supra note 2, at 619.
7. Douglas Lederman, Men Outnumber Women and Get Most of Money in Big-Time
Sports Programs, CHRON. HIGHER EDUC., Apr. 8, 1992, at Al, A38-A40.
8. Brief for Appellants at 9-12, Kelley v. Board of Trustees, 832 F. Supp. 237
(C.D. Ill. 1993), affd, 35 F.3d 265 (7th Cir. 1994), cert. denied, 13 USLW 3488
(1995).
9. Id.
10. Title IX was adopted in conference without formal hearings or a commit-
tee report. See S. REP. No. 798, 92d Cong., 2d Sess. 221-22 (1972). Sports were
only mentioned twice in the congressional debate. 118 CONG. REc. 5807 (1972)
(statement of Sen. Bayh) (personal privacy to be respected in sports facilities); 117
CONG. REC. 30,407 (1971) (statement of Sen. Bayh) (Title IX does not "mandate[ I
the desegregation of football fields. What we are trying to do is provide equal
[Vol. II: p. 25
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Rather, it provides a general prohibition against sex discrimination
in educational institutions. Therefore, the reasoning of these deci-
sions could be applied to curricular as well as athletic opportuni-
ties. Will admission to limited-enrollment advanced seminars in
English or physics be determined by academic standards and stu-
dent preferences or by the mandates of federal discrimination law?
II. WOMEN IN COLLEGE ATHLETICS UNDER TITLE IX
When Congress enacted Title IX in 1972, women were an "in-
conspicuous part of the storied athletic past," principally because of
the absence of opportunities for women athletes prior to the
1970s. 11
Since then, Title IX has been a major impetus in putting wo-
men's athletics on the map. In the years after Title IX was enacted,
participation in women's varsity athletics burgeoned.1 2 By 1984,
the percentage of women's varsity athletics had more than doubled
from 15% to 31%.13 A recent survey of 204 NCAA Division I col-
leges and universities showed that women generally comprise be-
tween 20% to 40% of a college's varsity athletes, with the average
participation rate being about 36%.14
Even though the percentage of women participating in college
varsity athletics has markedly increased in the last two decades, the
growth rate appears to have slowed and the percentage has not ap-
proached 50%. At institutions offering men and women the same
number of athletic teams, more males usually participate in athlet-
ics because football teams have four to five times the number of
players as teams in other sports.15 Thus, on average, the women's
enrollment rate in colleges and universities exceeds the participa-
access for women and men students to the educational process and the extracur-
ricular activities in a school, where there is not a unique facet such as football
involved.").
11. Cohen v. Brown Univ., 991 F.2d 888, 892 (1st Cir. 1993). At many col-
leges and universities, there were no women's athletic programs because there
were no female students. Women's sports programs developed as colleges and
universities became coeducational. See id.
12. BERRY & WONG, supra note 2, at 212.
13. Id.
14. Lederman, supra note 7.
15. For example, some of the schools in the Patriot League, a league not
known for its football prowess, carry football teams of up to 120 players. Debra E.
Blum, Athletics Notes, CHRON. HIGHER EDUC., Jan. 5, 1994, at A48. While men and
women athletes competing in the same sports, such as soccer, swimming, track or
tennis, are for the most part treated equally with respect to coaching, facilities and
other kinds of support, men's programs remain more expensive overall, in part
because of the cost of football. Lederman, supra note 7; see, e.g., OCR Letter of
Finding University of Arkansas (1992); OCR Letter of Finding Mercer University
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tion rate of women in varsity athletics by more than 10%.16 The
enrollment rate exceeds the participation rate in varsity athletics at
297 of the 298 Division I schools.1 7
The participation rates in intercollegiate varsity athletics reflect
the participation rates of boys and girls at the high school level,
where students acquire the experience and skill necessary for col-
lege competition. Surveys show that about 36% of high school var-
sity athletes are female,18 the same percentage of women who
participate in collegiate varsity athletics.19  Accordingly, the
probability that a female high school athlete will find a place on a
college varsity team equals that of a male high school athlete. Thus,
colleges and universities appear to be accommodating the interests
and abilities of female athletes to the same extent as they accommo-
date the interests and abilities of male athletes.
To state that a smaller percentage of women than men have
varsity interest and ability does not accurately compare men's abili-
ties with women's. Ability in this context means only that individu-
als have the ability to compete at the varsity level against others of
their own sex.20 For example, the percentage of women with varsity
ability in sports which are played principally by women clearly ex-
ceeds the percentage of men with that ability, even though the level
of interest and ability for athletic varsity competition overall is lower
for women.
Overall differences in varsity interest and ability among college
men and women may be explained either by different levels of in-
terest or by differences in opportunities to receive the training nec-
(1991); OCR Letter of Finding Loyola College (1990); OCR Letter of Finding Uni-
versity of Nebraska (1989).
16. Blum, supra note 15, at A48.
17. A state court decision which forced Washington State University to add
two women's sports is the reason why that school's participation rate is the same as
its enrollment rate. See Blair v. Washington State Univ., 740 P.2d 1379, 1381
(Wash. 1987) (affirming lower court order requiring university to increase female
participation opportunities until proportional to female enrollment). As a result,
Washington State University now provides nine women's varsity sports and seven
men's varsity sports. See Mary Jordan, Only One School Meets Gender Equity Goal,
WASH. PosT, June 21, 1992, at D1.
18. National Federation of State High School Associations, 1992 Sports Partic-
ipation Survey.
19. Lederman, supra note 7.
20. The Athletics Regulation effectively requires that institutions offer sepa-
rate men's and women's sports. 34 C.F.R. § 106.41(b) (1994). The Athletics Regu-
lation compares the abilities of men and women only in the limited circumstance
covered by section 106.41(b), which requires an institution that fails to offer a
women's team in a non-contact sport to permit a woman with the requisite ability
to try out for the men's team. Id.
[Vol. II: p. 25
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essary to develop varsity level skills. Except in certain sports rarely
offered in high school, it is extraordinarily difficult for men and
women who lack high school varsity experience to develop varsity
skills in college. Given this difficulty, the interest and ability factor
is essentially a combination of interest in sports, high school varsity
experience and competitive competence at the college level. Ac-
cordingly, absent changes in the participation rate at the high
school level, the ratio of men to women with varsity interest and
ability at the college level will likely remain at or near sixteen to
nine.
Other evidence suggests that a greater percentage of men have
an interest in making athletic competition a part of their college
experience. Unlike a varsity sports program, which requires ath-
letes to try out for a limited number of positions, intramural sports
are open to anyone. In contrast to varsity sports, intramurals pro-
vide students with opportunities to learn sports with which they may
not have been familiar in high school. If women were interested in
sports to the same extent as men, then women theoretically would
participate in intramurals to the same extent. But at Brown Univer-
sity, evidence showed that the ratio of men to women participating
in intramurals was eight to one.21 Similarly, anecdotal evidence
suggests that men make far greater recreational use of athletics fa-
cilities2 2 for pick-up games and other forms of informal sport.23
While increased opportunities have increased participation by
women, one cannot assume that the same percentage of women as
men have an interest in participating in varsity sports. Many activi-
ties in college involve different levels of interest among men and
women. To propose that equal percentages of women and men
want to participate in varsity athletics is no more valid than to pro-
pose that female and male athletes want to participate in precisely
the same sports. The proportionality requirement test rests entirely
21. Appellants' Brief in Support of Motions to Stay Preliminary Injunction
Pending Appeal at 13-14 n.7, Cohen v. Brown Univ., 991 F.2d 888, 892 (1st Cir.
1993).
22. Women's participation in informal athletic activities may be un-
dercounted because several types of athletic endeavor more popular among wo-
men, such as aerobics and dance, may not be classified as athletics.
23. The greater participation rates of men may be a result of biology. Studies
show that male children are more prone to engage in rough and tumble play. E.g.,
Anthony D. Pellegrini, Rough & Tumble Play: Developmental & Educational Signifi-
cance, 22 Enuc. PSYCHOLOGIST 23 (1987); Janet A. Pietro, Rough & Tumble Play: A
Function of Gender, 17 DEVELOPMENTAL PSYCHOL. 50 (1981). While these studies
arguably reflect a lack of encouragement of female children, it is hard to foresee a
day in which there will be comparable interest among women in "smash into peo-
ple for the fun of it" sports such as football, boxing and wrestling.
1995]
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on the unsupported assumption that the proportion of men and
women interested in varsity competition equals the proportion of
men and women enrolled at a college or university.
As a result, the proportional to enrollment test imposes an ob-
ligation on virtually every college and university either to add wo-
men's sports, cut men's sports, increase the number of participants
on women's teams and reduce the number of participants on men's
teams, or adopt some combination of these measures without re-
gard to the current varsity interests and abilities of their students.
Such additions and subtractions must be performed until the ratio
of women varsity athletes to men varsity athletes is "substantially
proportionate"2 4 to the ratio of women to men students. Without
having a basis in students' interests and abilities, these additions
and subtractions are not only arbitrary, but are in themselves dis-
criminatory and contrary to the intent of Title IX. While the idea
that equal percentages of men and women should participate in
varsity athletics is seductively simple, Title IX's purpose is to identify
discrimination in varsity athletics, a different and more complex
task.
III. WHAT TITLE IX PROVIDES
A. The Statutory and Regulatory Framework
Tide IX requires educational institutions to provide benefits
both to men and women without discriminating against persons of
either sex. The statute provides that "[n]o person in the United
States shall, on the basis of sex, be excluded from participation in,
be denied the benefits of, or be subjected to discrimination under
any education program or activity receiving Federal financial assist-
ance."2 5 Additionally, the statute provides that Tide IX may not be
interpreted to require "preferential or disparate treatment to the
members of one sex on account of an imbalance which may exist
with respect to the total number or percentage of persons of that
sex participating in" that program or activity.2 6 Tide IX makes no
24. Courts have not yet determined what is an acceptable difference in the
percentage of women's varsity participation and their undergraduate enrollment.
In Roberts v. Colorado State Board of Agriculture, the United States Court of Appeals
for the Tenth Circuit stated that a 10.5% difference was not "substantially propor-
tionate" but that a 1.7% difference was acceptable. 998 F.2d 824, 830 (10th Cir.),
cert. denied, 114 S. Ct. 580 (1993).
25. 20 U.S.C. § 1681(a) (1988).
26. 20 U.S.C. § 1681(b) (1988).
[Vol. II: p. 25
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specific reference to athletics programs,27 and Title IX's sparse leg-
islative history contains almost no discussion of Title IX's effect on
athletics.28
Title IX is applied to athletics in two regulations29 issued in
1975 by the Office of Civil Rights ("OCR") of the Department of
Health, Education and Welfare ("HEW'),so to which Congress dele-
gated regulatory responsibility. The regulation implementing Title
IX was signed by President Ford on May 27, 1975,31 and submitted
to Congress for review pursuant to section 431 (d) (1) of the Gen-
eral Education Provisions Act ("GEPA").32 Congress held hearings
on the regulation and did not disapprove the regulation during the
45-day period allowed under the GEPA.33 The more comprehen-
sive regulation (the "Athletics Regulation") prohibits discrimina-
tion against athletes on the basis of sex within any "interscholastic,
intercollegiate, club or intramural athletics" program and focuses
on effective accommodation of athletes.3 4
A separate regulation addresses athletic scholarships.3 5 The
athletic scholarship regulation requires only that athletic scholar-
27. The "Javits Amendment" to Title IX specifically relates Title IX to athlet-
ics. This 1974 amendment authorized the Secretary of the Department of Health,
Education and Welfare to prepare and publish proposed regulations implement-
ing Tide IX, "which shall include with respect to intercollegiate athletic activities
reasonable provisions considering the nature of particular sports." Section 844 of
the Education Amendments of 1974, Pub. L. 93-380, 88 Stat. 612 (1974).
28. For a discussion of the legislative history of Tide IX, see supra note 10.
29. 34 C.F.R. § 106.41(a)-(d) (1994); 34 C.F.R. § 106.37 (1994).
30. In 1979, Congress split HEW into the Department of Health and Human
Services ("HHS") and the Department of Education ("DED"). See 20 U.S.C.
§§ 3401-3510 (1988). Although both Departments have promulgated identical
regulations (save for changes in nomenclature), compare 45 C.F.R. pt. 86 (1994)
(HHS regulations) with 34 C.F.R. pt. 106 (1994) (DED regulations, the Depart-
ment of Education, acting through OCR, has been the principal administrative
agency carrying out Title IX enforcement since 1979). See Cohen v. Brown Univ.,
991 F.2d 888, 895 (1st Cir. 1993) (noting importance of DED's interpretation of
Title IX deference).
31. Title IX of the Education Amendments of 1972: A Policy Interpretation: Title
IX and Intercollegiate Athletics, 44 Fed. Reg. 71,413 (1979) [hereinafter Policy
Interpretation].
32. Id.
33. Id. The regulation became effective on July 21, 1975. It afforded institu-
tions a three year period to comply with its requirements. Id.
34. 34 C.F.R. § 106.41(a) (1994). Section 106.41(a) provides the following:
No person in the United States shall, on the basis of sex, be excluded
from participation in, be denied the benefits of, be treated differently
from another person or otherwise be discriminated against in any inter-
scholastic, intercollegiate, club or intramural athletics ... and no recipi-
ent shall provide any such athletics separately on such basis.
Id.
35. 34 C.F.R. § 106.37(c) (1994).
1995]
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ships be allocated in proportion to the actual number of partici-
pants of each sex in athletics, stating the following: "To the extent
that a recipient awards athletic scholarships or grants-in-aid, it must
provide reasonable opportunities for such awards for members of
each sex in proportion to the number of students of each sex participating
in interscholastic or intercollegiate athletics."3 6 Thus, the regulation
on athletic scholarships focuses exclusively upon the proportion of
students of each sex actually participating in varsity athletics and
does not require that the number of scholarships be proportional
to the enrollment of each sex.
While the Athletics Regulation is not so explicit, neither does it
provide any basis for a proportional to enrollment test. The Athlet-
ics Regulation applies the general statutory ban on sex discrimina-
tion to athletics by requiring both: (i) that opportunities to
participate at each level of competition (varsity, club and intramu-
ral) be made available on a nondiscriminatory basis, and (ii) that
there be no discrimination on the basis of sex in the treatment of
the athletes competing within each level.37
The Athletics Regulation sets forth ten non-exclusive factors to
be considered. The first factor considers the provision of opportu-
nities to compete at each level,3 8 while the remaining factors con-
sider the support provided to athletes within each level.39 The
36. Id. (emphasis added).
37. 34 C.F.R. § 106.41(a) (1994). For the text of § 106.41 (a), see supra note
34. The Athletics Regulation does not contemplate that comparisons will be
drawn between varsity teams sponsored for one sex and club or intramural teams
sponsored for the other. It is expected that a varsity team will receive more bene-
fits than a club or intramural team. See Cook v. Colgate Univ., 992 F.2d 17, 18 (2d
Cir. 1993) (recognizing that greater status and visibility of varsity teams justifies
higher recognition, encouragement and financial support than for club teams).
38. 34 C.F.R. § 106.41(c)(1) (1994).
39. 34 C.F.R. § 106.41(c) (1994). Section 106.41(c) states the following:
Equal Opportunity. A recipient which operates or sponsors interscholastic,
intercollegiate, club or intramural athletics shall provide equal athletic
opportunity for members of both sexes. In determining whether equal
opportunities are available the Director will consider, among other
factors:
(1) Whether the selection of sports and levels of competition effec-
tively accommodate the interests and abilities of members of both
sexes;
(2) The provision of equipment and supplies;
(3) Scheduling of games and practice time;
(4) Travel and per diem allowance;
(5) Opportunity to receive coaching and academic tutoring;
(6) Assignment and compensation of coaches and tutors;
(7) Provision of locker rooms, practice and competitive facilities;
(8) Provision of medical and training facilities and services;
(9) Provision of housing and dining facilities and services;
(10) Publicity.
[Vol. II: p. 25
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Athletics Regulation concludes by prohibiting the use of evidence
of unequal expenditures for men's and women's teams as the basis
for Title IX liability.40
Subsection (c) (1) requires that the interests and abilities of
both sexes be accommodated with equal effectiveness. 41 The re-
cent Courts of Appeals' opinions, however, ignored this subsection
of the Athletics Regulation and gave preference to regulatory policy
pronouncements having a lesser legal status.42
B. The OCR Policy Interpretation
While the statute and the regulations form the law of Title IX,
recent cases have elevated an earlier interpretive statement known
as the "Policy Interpretation" to a status above that of the statute
and the regulations.
Following numerous inquiries by institutions having difficulty
achieving compliance with the July 1978 deadline in the Athletics
Regulation, 43 HEW issued a proposed Policy Interpretation in
1978. 44 After a comment period in which 700 groups and institu-
tions "reflecting a broad range of opinion" aired their views, HEW
issued a final Policy Interpretation in 1979.45 The Policy Interpreta-
tion gave institutions that were moving toward compliance with the
Athletics Regulation additional time to comply with the deadline
Id.
40. Thus, the fact that a university spends more money on its men's varsity
program than its women's varsity program does not provide a basis for liability
under Tide IX. The Athletics Regulation expressly states, "[u]nequal aggregate
expenditures... will not constitute noncompliance with this section." Id. Policy
Interpreation, supra note 31, at 71,413, 71,416, 71,419, 71,422 (recognizing that
unique characteristics of some sports, such as football, draw large numbers of spec-
tators which necessitate extra expenditures and large budgets).
41. 34 C.F.R. § 106.41(c) (1) (1994). For the text of§ 106.41 (c) (1), see supra
note 39.
42. The OCR has applied the Athletics Regulation as an entirety, weighing an
institution's overall program to determine whether the institution is in compliance
with Title IX. The courts, however, have looked at isolated elements of the Regula-
tion and are prepared to find a violation of the statute solely on the basis of non-
compliance with subsection (c) (1) of the Athletics Regulation.
43. 34 C.F.R. § 106.41(d) (1994). This section required that secondary or
post-secondary institutions comply fully with the regulation's requirements within
three years of the regulation's effective date. Elementary schools had to comply
within one year. Id.
44. Proposed Policy Interpretation, 43 Fed. Reg. 58,070 (1978) (codified in
45 C.F.RIL pt. 86 (1994)).
45. Policy Interpretation, supra note 31, at 71,413. The final Policy Interpreta-
tion reflected the views expressed during a public comment period and the results
of HEW's visits. HEW intended the Policy Interpretation to explain the regulation
and offer guidelines as to what constituted compliance with Tide IX requirements
for intercollegiate athletic programs.
1995]
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established in the Athletics Regulation 46 providing, among other
things, a safe harbor for colleges showing a "history of program
expansion."
In contrast to the statute and the Athletics Regulation which
have the force of law,47 the Policy Interpretation is not entitled to
any more deference than is warranted by whatever inherent persua-
siveness it may have.48 In no event can the Policy Interpretation
contradict the Title IX statute or the Athletics Regulation.
The Policy Interpretation established three "safe harbors" by
which colleges and universities could avoid regulatory sanctions
under Title IX:
(1) Whether intercollegiate level participation opportuni-
ties for male and female students are provided in numbers
substantially proportionate to their respective enrollments, or
(2) Where the members of one sex have been and are un-
derrepresented among intercollegiate athletes, whether
the institution can show a history and continuing practice of
program expansion which is demonstrably responsive to the
developing interest and abilities of the members of that
sex; or
(3) Where the members of one sex are underrepresented
among intercollegiate athletes, and the institution cannot
show a continuing practice of program expansion such as
that cited above, whether it can be demonstrated that the
interests and abilities of the members of that sex have been fully
and effectively accommodated by the present program. 49
46. 34 C.F.R. § 106.41(d) (1994). For a discussion of § 106.41(d), see supra
note 43.
47. The Athletics Regulation was submitted to Congress pursuant to 20 U.S.C.§ 1232(d) (1988) and has the force and effect of law. "Rules enacted by an admin-
istrative agency pursuant to statutory delegation, called substantive or legislative
rules, must be judicially enforced as if laws enacted by Congress itself." Drake v.
Honeywell, Inc., 797 F.2d 603, 607 (8th Cir. 1986) (citations omitted).
48. The Policy Interpretation is an interpretive statement that was not submit-
ted to Congress or enacted pursuant to statutory delegation. It was "issued merely
to provide guidance to parties whose conduct may be governed by the underlying
statute, and to courts which must construe it." Id. It carries "no more weight on
judicial review than [its] inherent persuasiveness commands." Id. (citing Batterton
v. Marshall, 648 F.2d 694, 702 (D.C. Cir. 1980)); see Continental Training Servs.,
Inc. v. Cavazos, 893 F.2d 877, 885 n.10 (7th Cir. 1990) (noting no deference due
for informal agency interpretations); Pearce v. Department of Labor, 647 F.2d 716,
726 (7th Cir. 1981) (stating that reasonable regulations have force and effect of
law when promulgated pursuant to statutory authority); Class v. Norton, 507 F.2d
1058, 1062(2d Cir. 1974) (recognizing regulations have presumptive force of law).
49. Policy Interpretation, supra note 31, at 71,418 (emphasis added). Compli-
ance with the Regulation was assessed by any one of the three safe harbors pro-
vided by the Policy Interpretation.
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These safe harbors reflected the OCR's enforcement priorities
in 1979. As noted above, the second safe harbor gives protection to
institutions moving toward compliance if they can show a history of
program expansion. If an institution satisfies either the third safe
harbor by fully accommodating women or the first safe harbor by
providing places proportional to enrollment, then any Title IX vio-
lation would in all likelihood discriminate against men. This was a
possibility the OCR was obviously prepared to overlook in an era of
substantial non-compliance with respect to women athletes. 50
Thus, the Policy Interpretation provided safe havens for universities
in the process of working toward Title IX compliance.
While they are defensible as a means to encourage opportuni-
ties for women and concentrate enforcement resources on the
more egregious cases, the safe harbors make no sense as tests of
Title IX liability. A university may fall within any of the three safe
harbors and yet be in violation of Title IX:
- an institution that has participation proportional to
enrollment under the first safe harbor is discriminating
under Title IX if the ratio of men and women athletes
with interests and abilities for varsity competition is differ-
ent from the ratio of men and women in the school
population;
- an institution that has a history of program expansion
under the second safe harbor may nevertheless be well
short of effectively accommodating its male and female
athletes on an equal basis; and
- an institution that fully accommodates one sex under
the third safe harbor is discriminating under Title IX if it
does not also fully accommodate the other sex.
Indeed, as tests of liability, the safe harbors are in conflict with
the statute and the Athletics Regulation:
Subsection (1), the "proportionate to enrollment" test, would
require institutions to create positions for women students irrespec-
50. The proportional to enrollment test of subsection (1) and the full accom-
modation test of subsection (3) would be useful as safe harbors to a university
which had only recently become coeducational and was beginning an athletics pro-
gram for the sex that did not yet constitute a substantial percentage of the student
body. Thus, it may be that OCR intended these two safe harbors for the benefit of
universities that were becoming co-educational in the 1970's. See What Is This
Thing Called Coeducation?, MouNT HoLYoKE ALUMNAE Q. 241 (Gale Stubbs Mc-
Clung ed. 1972).
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tive of their athletic interest or ability. This would be a form of
affirmative action prohibited by the statute.51
Subsection (2), the "program expansion" test, would impose
requirements not imposed by the statute and Athletics Regulation
on schools where no recent expansion was required to achieve
equally effective accommodation of male and female athletes.
Moreover, on its face, a "program expansion" test would penalize
those institutions that added women's teams in the 1970's and
1980's, and would reward institutions that failed to follow Title IX's
mandate until recently.5 2
Subsection (3), the "interests and abilities" test, would require
an institution to "fully" accommodate the athletes capable of varsity
level competition in the "underrepresented" sex. Even when quali-
fied by the independent requirements that there be sufficient num-
bers of athletes to form a team and a reasonable prospect of
sufficient opportunities to provide intercollegiate competition, 53
"full" accommodation of athletes of one sex clearly would not pre-
clude discriminatory under-accommodation of athletes of the other
sex.
Internal inconsistencies in the Policy Interpretation also de-
tract from whatever inherent persuasiveness it might otherwise
command. Several passages in the Policy Interpretation conflict
with other passages in the document, reflecting the OCR's failure
to reconcile a number of the competing positions reflected in the
"broad range" of opinions expressed by the commenters. 54 Other
sections of the Policy Interpretation contradict the terms of the
Athletics Regulation and in that regard merit no deference whatso-
51. 20 U.S.C. § 1681(b) (1988).
52. Brown University, for example, was unable to take advantage of subsec-
tion (2), even though it had added 14 women's varsity teams between 1971 when it
became coeducational and 1977, because it had added only one women's team
since then. Cohen v. Brown Univ., 991 F.2d 888, 892, 903 (1st Cir. 1993).
53. Policy Interpretation, supra note 31, at 71,413, 71,418.
54. For example, although the Policy Interpretation repeatedly emphasizes
that comparisons between the men's and women's varsity athletics programs must
be made on an overall basis, it also suggests that if "some aspects of athletic pro-
grams" are not equivalent, then Title IX liability may exist. Id. at 71,415.
In contrast to the proportional to enrollment test, other sections concerned
with proportionality consider the relevant pool to be athletes, not total enroll-
ment. Compliance with the "levels of competition" requirement of the Athletics
Regulation is assessed by examining, among other things, "whether the competi-
tive schedules for men's and women's teams, on a program-wide basis, afford pro-
portionally similar numbers of male and female athletes equivalently advanced
competitive opportunities." Id. at 71,418 (emphasis added).
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ever.55 The document should be viewed with skepticism because
the Policy Interpretation contradicts itself, as well as the Athletics
Regulation. A test of liability must pass muster under the Title IX
statute and the Athletics Regulation, according to recognized prin-
ciples of discrimination law. However, this is not the direction the
courts have taken to date.
IV. THE PROPORTIONAL TO ENROLLMENT TEST
A. Recent Court Decisions
Although Title IX was on the books for twenty years, case law
was slow in developing. There are several explanations for this.
The statute itself provided a three-year period for universities to
comply. The Athletics Regulation extended the time for compli-
ance to 1978, and the 1979 Policy Interpretation's "history of pro-
gram expansion" safe harbor provided additional time for many
institutions.
Prior to the Supreme Court's decision in Cannon v. University of
Chicago,5 6 it was not generally recognized that private suits could be
brought under Tide IX.5 7 In 1984, the development of Title IX
came to a temporary halt when the Supreme Court held in Grove
City College v. Bell 8 that Title IX did not apply to programs within
colleges, such as athletics, which did not receive direct federal
assistance.59 Grove City remained the law until the Civil Rights Res-
toration Act of 1987 was enacted, 60 providing that effective March
22, 1988 all aspects of academic institutions receiving federal funds
55. For example, the Athletics Regulation expressly recognizes that colleges
may sponsor some teams for men with no corresponding women's teams. 34
C.F.R. § 106.41(b) (1994). Subsection (c)(4) of the Policy Interpretation contra-
dicts the Atheltics Regulation, suggesting that if a men's varsity team is provided in
a contact sport, a women's varsity team must also be provided.
56. 441 U.S. 677 (1979).
57. Id. Title IX does not explicitly authorize a private cause of action. Id. at
696. In Cannon, the Court observed that Title IX was modeled after Title VI, which
had been construed as creating a private remedy. Id. The Cannon Court con-
cluded that the drafters of Title IX assumed that it would be construed like Title
VI. Id.
58. 465 U.S. 555 (1984).
59. Title IX only applies to programs that are federally funded or aided. 20
U.S.C. § 1682 provides, "Compliance with any requirement adopted pursuant to
this section may be effected . . . by the termination of or refusal to grant or to
continue assistance under such program or activity." See Grove City, 465 U.S. at 558
n.2. In Grove City, the Supreme Court held that Title IX applied only to programs
which actually receive federal funds, placing virtually every collegiate athletic pro-
gram outside the reach of Title IX. Id. at 574.
60. Pub. L. No. 100-259, 102 Stat. 28 (1988).
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were subject to Tide IX.61 Until recently, the OCR's relatively leni-
ent enforcement history provided further discouragement to pri-
vate plaintiffs, and during the boom years of the 1980's, institutions
were substantially expanding their women's varsity athletic pro-
grams. The stringent budget pressures of the 1990's, however, have
brought program cutbacks and the elimination of men's and wo-
men's athletic teams. This was the basis for the lawsuits in each of
the three recent cases.
None of the three Title IX decisions - Cohen v. Brown Univer-
sity,62 Roberts v. Colorado State Board of Agriculture,63 and Favia v. Indi-
ana University of Pennsylvania 4 - considered the possibility that the
three subsections of the Policy Interpretation may not be the funda-
mental tests of Tide IX liability. All three courts simply assumed
that these subsections stated the law and focused on whether their
requirements had been met.65 Following these decisions, the pro-
portional to enrollment test of subsection (1) has emerged as the
only possible means of Tide IX compliance when a university is cut-
ting back on the number of sports offered to men and women.
This is the case because by definition, a university that eliminates
varsity teams cannot show a recent history of program expansion
with which to satisfy subsection (2) or show full accommodation
under subsection (3).
1. Cohen
In 1991, Brown University announced plans to drop four teams
from its varsity athletics program as a "belt tightening measure":66
men's water polo and golf and women's volleyball and gymnastics.
Brown eliminated financial subsidies and support services for the
teams but permitted them to continue competing as clubs.67
Disappointed members of the two eliminated women's teams
brought a suit seeking the reinstatement of both teams and a pre-
61. 20 U.S.C. § 1685 (1992).
62. 991 F.2d 888 (1st Cir. 1993).
63. 998 F.2d 824 (10th Cir.), cert. denied, 114 S. Ct. 580 (1993).
64. 7 F.3d 332 (3d Cir. 1993).
65. Two of the courts did note that subsection (1) constitutes a safe harbor in
that it permits institutions to "stay on the sunny side of Title IX simply by maintain-
ing gender parity between its student body and its athletic lineup." Cohen, 991 F.2d
at 898; see also Roberts, 998 F.2d at 829. This observation did not prevent the courts
from using the safe harbor as a test for liability.
66. Cohen, 991 F.2d at 892.
67. Id. Brown cut off services available to other varsity sports, such as coach-
ing, prime facilities, practice time and trainers. Id.
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liminary injunction. 68 Plaintiffs' case centered on the Athletics Reg-
ulation's reference to "equal athletic opportunity" for both sexes. 69
Plaintiffs argued that while Brown's undergraduate enrollment was
approximately 52% men and 48% women prior to the cutbacks,
Brown provided a ratio of 36.7% women's positions to 63.3% men's
positions. 70 Although women retained virtually the same percent-
age of varsity positions after the cutbacks, plaintiffs asserted that the
cutbacks adversely affected women by taking more dollars from the
women's varsity budget than from the men's varsity budget.71
Plaintiffs argued before the district court that a failure to pro-
vide "equal" participation opportunities for men and women within
the meaning of the Athletics Regulation72 automatically resulted in
Title IX liability regardless of how the university supported athletes
within each level of competition. 7s They further argued that the
court should apply the Policy Interpretation's three subsections to
determine whether Brown provided "equal athletic opportunity."74
The district court agreed, adopting the three subsections of
the Policy Interpretation as tests of liability.75 The district court
found that Brown failed to comply with any of the subsections: (1)
the number of women and men athletes was not proportional to
the number of women and men enrolled; (2) the University did not
have a recent history of program expansion; and (3) the University
was not fully accommodating women athletes, having dropped two
68. Id. at 892. Plaintiffs sued on behalf of a class of "all present and future
Brown University women students and potential students who participate, seek to
participate, and/or are deterred from participating in intercollegiate athletics
funded by Brown." Id. at 893.
69. 34 C.F.R. § 106.41(c) (1994).
70. Cohen, 991 F.2d at 892.
71. Id. Abolishing the two women's teams saved the university $62,028; abol-
ishing the two men's teams saved $15,795. Id.
72. 34 C.F.R § 106.41(c) (1) (1994). If the Cohen court was correct in reading
subsection (3) as requiring full accommodation of both sexes, subsection (1) is the
only means of compliance, even for an institution that has maintained the status
quo and has resisted budget pressures to cut teams. Cohen, 991 F.2d at 899 n.16.
73. 34 C.F.R. § 106.41(c)(2)-(10) (1994).
74. Cohen v. Brown Univ., 809 F. Supp. 978, 985 (D.1I. 1992), aff'd, 991 F.2d
888 (1st Cir. 1993). Plaintiffs also asserted violations of Title IX in other aspects of
Brown's athletics program, alleging disparities in training, coaching, equipment,
publicity and recruitment. Id. at 986. In its defense Brown argued that its varsity
athletics program had to be assessed as a whole, urging the court to consider not
only § 106.41(c) (1) but the other nine factors listed in § 106.41(c) as well. Id. at
987.
75. The district court assumed that these subsections were tests of liability and
considered only whether they were tests for measuring equal opportunities to par-
ticipate, as plaintiffs argued, or whether they were tests for measuring whether the
"levels of competition" effectively accommodated the interests and abilities of both
sexes, as Brown argued.
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varsity women's teams.7 6 The district court, therefore, ordered re-
instatement of the two women's teams pending a trial on the
merits.
7 7
Affirming the district court, the United States Court of Appeals
for the First Circuit did not address the propriety of using the three
subsections as tests of Title IX liability. The court confined itself to
reviewing the district court's findings with respect to Brown's
noncompliance with the three subsections of the Policy
Interpretation. 78
2. Roberts
In 1992, Colorado State University announced the elimination
of its women's varsity softball team and its men's varsity baseball
team.7 9 Although the elimination of both teams increased the per-
centage of varsity positions provided to women, there remained a
difference of 10.5% between the percentage of female varsity ath-
letes and percentage of females enrolled at Colorado State.80
Colorado State's appeal from the district court's adverse judg-
ment raised three principal issues: whether the opportunities pro-
vided were "substantially proportionate" to enrollment within the
meaning of subsection (1) given the 10.5% difference, whether Col-
orado State's expansion of women's athletic opportunities in the
1970s constituted a "history and continuing practice of program ex-
pansion" within the meaning of subsection (2), and whether, in
eliminating men's baseball and women's softball simultaneously,
Colorado State was providing "full and effective accommodation" of
the interests and abilities of its female athletes within the meaning
76. Cohen, 809 F. Supp. at 991-93. After the four varsity teams were converted
to club teams, there were 63.4% men and 36.6% women athletes although the
enrollment rates were 51.8% men and 48.2% women. Therefore, the court found
that the ratio was not "substantially proportionate." Id. at 991. Additionally,
though there was some program expansion in the 1970s, evidence showed that
Brown did not have "a continuing practice of program expansion for female ath-
letes." Id. Finally, the court found that Brown failed to accommodate the interests
and abilities of women athletes because it had eliminated two women's varsity
teams. Id. at 992.
77. Id. at 999-1001.
78. Cohen v. Brown Univ., 991 F.2d 888, 897 (1st Cir. 1993).
79. Roberts v. Colorado State Bd. of Agric., 998 F.2d 824, 826 (10th Cir.), cert.
denied, 114 S. Ct. 580 (1993).
80. Id. at 831. The Tenth Circuit disagreed with the district court that a
10.5% discrepancy between athletic participation by women and enrollment by
women was substantially proportionate. Id. at 830.
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of subsection (3).81 Following the First Circuit's reasoning in Co-
hen, the Tenth Circuit found that the University failed to meet the
requirements of any of the three subsections.82
3. Favia
The third case, Favia v. Indiana University of Pennsylvania,83
arose after Indiana University of Pennsylvania (IUP), citing "budg-
etary concerns," announced plans to discontinue four varsity ath-
letic programs: men's tennis and soccer and women's gymnastics
and field hockey.84 As in Cohen, disappointed members of the two
women's teams brought a class action suit under Title IX, seeking a
preliminary injunction ordering the University to reinstate both wo-
men's teams.85
Relying on evidence that women comprised only 39% of the
varsity athletes, but 55.6% of the student body, the district court
issued the injunction.86 The University sought a modification of
the order which would have allowed it to substitute women's soccer,
a team with a greater number of varsity slots, for women's gymnas-
tics. This substitution would have increased the percentage of
varsity female athletes to 43%.87 The district court refused the Uni-
versity's request.
On appeal, the United States Court of Appeals for the Third
Circuit affirmed the district court's order, finding no abuse of dis-
cretion. The Third Circuit did not independently analyze Title IX,
but simply relied on Cohen for the proposition that, in the absence
81. Id. at 829-32. Colorado State also argued on appeal "that the district
court erred in holding that plaintiffs were not required to show discriminatory
intent." Id. at 832. The Tenth Circuit rejected this argument.
82. In its brief analysis of the Athletics Regulation, the Tenth Circuit simply
noted that "[a]lthough § 106.41(c) goes on to list nine other factors that enter
into a determination of equal opportunity in athletics, an institution may violate
Tide IX simply by failing to accommodate effectively the interests and abilities of
student athletes of both sexes." Id. at 828 (footnotes and citations omitted). For a
discussion of Cohen, see supra notes 65-77 and accompanying text.
83. 7 F.3d 332 (3d Cir. 1993).
84. Id. at 335.
85. Id. The district court simultaneously granted the injunction and certified
a class of "all present and future women students at I.U.P. who participate, seek to
participate, or are deterred from participating in intercollegiate athletics at the
University." Id.
86. Favia v. Indiana Univ. of Pa., 812 F. Supp. 578, 585 (W.D. Pa.), aff'd, 7
F.3d 332 (3d Cir. 1993).
87. Favia, 7 F.3d at 342. The addition of a women's soccer team would not
have brought IUP into full compliance with Title IX. However, it would have
raised the number of female athletes and would have brought IUP to the verge of
compliance. Id.
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of continuing program expansion, universities must meet either the
proportional to enrollment test or the full accommodation test.88
B. The Practical Implications of the Recent Court Decisions
1. Subsection (3): Fully Accommodated Interests and Abilities
If the "fully and effectively accommodated" language in subsec-
tion (3) is applied literally, every university being sued by members
of a former women's team or by any group of women capable of
varsity competition in any competitive sport, must necessarily fail
the test. The universities in Cohen, Roberts and Favia argued that,
consistent with other OCR discussions of subsection (3),89 full and
effective accommodation requires only that the women athletes at a
school be accommodated to the same extent as male varsity ath-
letes.90 That is, a university must accommodate those with interest
and ability in varsity athletics in an equally effective (or equally inef-
fective) way. For example, if a university with a student body con-
taining an equal number of male and female students has 250
women and 500 men with the interest and ability for varsity compe-
tition, it must offer varsity positions in a ratio of one to two but
need not offer any particular number of positions. 91 Thus, the uni-
versity could provide 300 varsity positions, 200 for men and 100 for
women - leaving 300 male athletes and 150 female athletes with-
out varsity positions.92
In the example just stated, the recent decisions would require
the university to provide varsity positions for all 250 female varsity
athletes, regardless of how many varsity positions were available for
its male varsity athletes. The courts recognized that "the mere fact
that there are some female students who express interest in a sport
does not ... require the school to provide a varsity team,"93 and
88. Id. at 343-44.
89. Thro & Snow report that "OCR has found numerous institutions to be in
compliance with respect to interests and abilities even though there is a gap be-
tween participation and enrollment. In at least five instances, OCR has found no
compliance even though the gap exceeded twenty one percentage points." Thro
& Snow, supra note 2, at 611, 614-15 n.23.
90. The OCR has read the Policy Interpretation in this manner in assessing
compliance.
91. See Cohen v. Brown Univ., 991 F.2d 888, 899 (1st Cir. 1993).
92. Id. Even the burden of relatively effectively accommodating female ath-
letes may make the expense of continuing a men's program too great. The diffi-
culty of complying with Title IX has led Brooklyn College to abandon its entire
varsity athletics program. See Carol Herwig, Questions Linger in Wake of Brooklyn's
Troubles, USA ToDAY, June 10, 1992, at C2; Roger Rubin, Brooklyn Faces Big Decisions:
Basketball Gone, But What Else?, NEWSDAY, June 12, 1992, at 163.
93. Cohen, 991 F.2d at 898.
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that under the Policy Interpretation, there must be "sufficient inter-
est and ability among the members of the excluded sex to sustain a
viable team and a reasonable expectation of intercollegiate compe-
tition for that team."94 However, the courts held that because the
plaintiffs had been members of a healthy women's varsity team that
had been eliminated, there was no question that some women var-
sity athletes were not being fully accommodated. These holdings
effectively foreclose resort to the interests and abilities test of sub-
section (3) .95
2. Subsection (2): Recent Program Expansion
The "program expansion" test of subsection (2) is effectively
unavailable to any institution sued by members of women's teams
that have been eliminated and probably unavailable to any univer-
sity which has not expanded its women's program in the 1990's.96
3. Subsection (1): Proportional to Enrollment
Ironically, compliance with a proportional to enrollment stan-
dard in times of economic difficulties may result in little or no gain
for women athletes. As the Tenth Circuit recognized in Roberts, "in
times of economic hardship, few schools will be able to satisfy Title
IX's effective accommodation requirement by continuing to ex-
pand their women's athletics programs."97 The court stated: "Fi-
nancially strapped institutions may still comply with Title IX by
cutting athletics programs such that men's and women's athletic
participation rates become substantially proportionate to their rep-
resentation in the undergraduate population." 98 The message is
clear: Institutions should comply by cutting men's teams without
regard to men's interests and abilities for varsity competition or
94. Id. (quoting Policy Interpretation, supra note 31, at 71,418).
95. Under this stringent interpretation of subsection (3), an institution must
provide a varsity sport if there are women who want to play the sport and have the
ability to play the sport, regardless of the institution's ability to sustain a team in
that sport. Thro & Snow, supra note 2, at 624. if, for example, the United States
Olympic Gymnastics team enrolled in an institution and wanted to compete, that
institution would be legally obligated to create a varsity gymnastics program, even
though it might lack the necessary equipment, facilities, coaching staff or expecta-
tion of being able to maintain a competitive team in the future. Id. at 625 n.109.
96. While most colleges and universities can point to rapid expansion in the
1970's and 1980's, the Roberts court denied the relevancy of these past efforts. Rob-
erts v. Colorado State Bd. of Agric., 998 F.2d 824, 830 (10th Cir.), cert. denied, 114 S.
Ct. 580 (1993). This logic forces universities to continue adding women's varsity
teams until eventually either the proportional to enrollment test or the full accom-
modation test is met.
97. Id. at 830; see also Cohen, 991 F.2d at 898 n.15.
98. Roberts, 998 F.2d at 830 (citation omitted).
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how short the men's program falls from equally accommodating
the abilities and interests of male students.
The redistribution of varsity positions from men to women in
accordance with enrollment rates would be especially difficult for
those universities with football teams. An institution which pro-
vides the same number of varsity teams for women and men and
provides a men's football team will inevitably provide more varsity
positions for men because the size of the average football team is
four to five times the size of other teams. To retain football, such
an institution would have to eliminate about four men's teams or
add four women's teams to meet the proportional to enrollment
test.99 Thus, a university with a football program presently provid-
ing eleven teams for each sex could meet the proportional to en-
rollment test by providing seven men's teams and eleven women's
teams1 00 or eleven men's teams and fifteen women's teams.10 1
Adding four additional women's teams would be problematic
not only because of the expense but also because institutions al-
ready offering the most popular sports will find few other sports
which have substantial interest among female athletes. There is a
large decrease in popularity from the eleven or twelve most popular
women's sports to the remaining women's sports.10 2 A university
providing eleven women's teams, for example, will typically provide
teams in popular women's sports such as soccer, basketball, softball,
volleyball, field hockey, cross country, track, swimming, tennis and
lacrosse. This leaves the university to choose among far more ob-
scure sports - including sports primarily played by affluent per-
sons such as equestrian competition - to add to its varsity
program. Several universities have recently added crew teams, but
few attractive choices exist beyond that.
99. While the regulation of squad sizes does have some impact on the distri-
bution of varsity positions, it would be difficult to maintain a football team and
satisfy the proportional to enrollment test without dropping men's teams, adding
women's teams, or both.
100. To be eligible for membership in Division I, the NCAA requires a school
to provide seven varsity sports. Thus, this approach would be unavailable to a
school currently sponsoring fewer than 11 varsity teams.
101. A program with a significantly greater number of women's teams than
men's teams would conflict with the Athletics Regulation's requirement that the
selection of sports "effectively accommodate the interests and abilities of members
of both sexes." 34 C.F.R. § 106.41 (c) (1) (1994); see Policy Interpretation, supra note
31, at 71,417 (stating that the Athletics Regulation requires "equal opportunity in
the selection of sports... available to members of both sexes.").
102. See RL VIvIAN ACOSTA & LINDAJ. CARPENTER, WOMEN IN INTERCOLLEGIATE
SPORT: A LONGITUDINAL STUDY - THIRTEEN YEAR UPDATE 1977-1990 (1990). This
sharp fall-off in popularity also occurs in men's athletics. Id.
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C. Title IX and Other Major Civil Rights Acts Prohibit the Same
Kind of Discrimination that the Proportional to
Enrollment Test Requires
There is no obvious reason why the proportion of men and
women in the student body as a whole should be important in de-
termining whether there is discrimination in the provision of varsity
athletic opportunities. Because the Athletics Regulation is imple-
menting a discrimination statute, the relevant pools of individuals
should be those students potentially subject to discrimination in
athletics - the female and male student-athletes with the interest
and ability to participate in varsity athletics.
A women's varsity program does not benefit women generally,
but rather exclusively benefits some or all of the subgroups of wo-
men with the athletic ability and interest to compete. The analysis
of discrimination in college athletic programs should focus on
whether the program accommodates those women with the interest
and ability to be varsity athletes to the same extent as it accommo-
dates men with the interest and ability to be varsity athletes.103
An athlete's opportunity to obtain a varsity position when the
athlete has the interest and ability should not be affected by the
athlete's sex. Providing opportunities in proportion to the num-
bers of athletes of each sex with interest and ability avoids sex dis-
crimination; providing opportunities in proportion to overall
enrollment creates discrimination.
The proportional to enrollment test is difficult to reconcile not
only with Title IX and the regulations under it but with the other
major civil rights statutes applicable in the college and university
setting, such as Tite VI of the Education Amendments of 1972 and
Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964.
1. Title IX and its Regulations
The proportional to enrollment test appears inconsistent with
Title IX in several ways. First, the test requires affirmative action
while the statute only prohibits "preferential or disparate treatment
to the members of one sex on account of an imbalance which may
exist with respect to the total number or percentage of persons of
that sex participating in" that program or activity.' 0 4 Adding varsity
positions for women until the percentage of women varsity athletes
103. A program with separate men's and women's teams in the same sports
already favors women. A program that was sex-blind and provided a single set of
teams for which both men and women could try out would largely favor men.
104. 20 U.S.C. § 1681(b) (1988).
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equals the percentage of women students is a form of affirmative
action. Second, the use of proportionality as the sole basis of liabil-
ity conflicts with Title IX's athletic scholarship regulation. The ath-
letic scholarship regulation expressly states that the relevant pool
will consist of participants in varsity athletics and not enrolled stu-
dents.105 The approach to proportionality taken in the scholarship
regulation is also evident in other sections of the Policy Interpreta-
tion's discussion of the Athletics Regulation. Thus, the Policy Inter-
pretation states: "If women athletes, as a class, are receiving
opportunities and benefits equal to those of male athletes, individu-
als within the class should be protected thereby."10 6 Third, and
more importantly, the decisions overlook the fact that achieving
proportionality requires discrimination on the basis of sex, a viola-
tion of the Title IX law in the statute and the Athletics Regulation.
In their recent opinions, the courts of appeals inappropriately ele-
vated a policy statement of administrators above the statute enacted
by Congress and above the regulations that carry the force and ef-
fect of law.'0 7
2. Title VI
Title IX was modeled on Title VI of the Education Amend-
ments of 1972, which prohibits racial discrimination by, among
others, colleges or universities receiving federal financial assistance.
Tide VI provides that:
No person in the United States shall, on the ground of
race, color, or national origin, be excluded from participa-
tion in, be denied the benefits of, or be subjected to dis-
crimination under any program or activity receiving
Federal financial assistance. 08
The Supreme Court has recognized that Tide IX was patterned
after Title VI, substituting "sex" for "race, color or national ori-
gin."10 9 The Court stated that: "The drafters of Title IX explicitly
105. 34 C.F.L § 106.37(c) (1994).
106. Policy Intrpretation, supra note 31, at 71,421 (emphasis added); see also
supra note 54.
107. See supra notes 45-46.
108. Section 901(a) of Tide VI of the Educational Amendments of 1972, 42
U.S.C. § 2000d (1992).
109. Cannon v. University of Chicago, 441 U.S. 677, 694 n.16 (1978) (quoting
117 CONG. Rzc. 30,407 (1971) (statement of Sen. Bayh) ("This is identical lan-
guage, specifically taken from title [sic] VI of the 1964 Civil Rights Act...." )); 117
CONG. REC. 30,407, 39,256 (1971) (statement of Sen. Bayh) ("We are only adding
the 3-letter word 'sex' to existing law").
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assumed that it would be interpreted and applied as Title VI had
been during the preceding eight years." 110 The cases decided
under Title VI make it clear that a proportional to enrollment test
would be contrary to the statute.111
Indeed, the application of a proportional to enrollment test
under Title VI in the athletics context would be outrageous. To
illustrate, consider a high school with an enrollment which is 50%
African-American and 50% white and which has a track team with
fifty available places. Tryouts show that 100 students have both the
interest and ability to compete in varsity track, sixty-four of whom
are African-American, thirty-six of whom are white. Under the pro-
portional to enrollment test, Title VI would require that the high
school allot twenty-five of the fifty places to the thirty-six white ath-
letes, while the sixty-four African-American athletes would have to
compete for the remaining twenty-five places. Such a result would
constitute blatant discrimination based on race. Yet this is the re-
sult mandated by the proportional to enrollment test.
In Title VI litigation, the Supreme Court has rejected the no-
tion that positions should be distributed proportionately on the ba-
sis of race without considering the qualifications of those available
to fill them. In the landmark case of University of Calfornia Regents
v. Bakke,'1 2 the Court struck down the University's plan reserving
sixteen of the 100 spots in each year's class for certain minority ap-
plicants. Rejecting the school's argument that the minority admis-
sions plan was necessary to reduce the historic deficit of minorities
in medical schools and the medical profession, a plurality of the
Court found the plan fatally flawed.113 Justice Powell wrote:
If petitioner's purpose is to assure within its student body
some specified percentage of a particular group merely
because of its race or ethnic origin, such a preferential
purpose must be rejected not as insubstantial but as
facially invalid. Preferring members of any one group for
no reason other than race or ethnic origin is discrimina-
tion for its own sake. 114
110. Cannon, 441 U.S. at 696; see also Grimes v. Sobol, 832 F. Supp. 704, 711
(S.D.N.Y. 1993) ("Courts have often noted the similarity in purpose and construc-
tion of Title VI and Title IX, and have found the Tide VI Regulations instructive in
interpreting Tide IX .... ").
111. See infra notes 112-17.
112. 438 U.S. 265 (1977).
113. Id. at 309-10.
114. Id. at 307; see also Davis v. Halpern, 768 F. Supp. 968, 975 (E.D.N.Y. 1991)
("[1It is quite possible that classifications favoring minorities or other groups his-
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The Supreme Court revisited this issue in City of Richmond v.
JA. Croson, Co.,115 a Fourteenth Amendment case. Croson brought
suit challenging a plan that required 30% of city construction con-
tracts to be awarded to "minority business enterprises."11 6 The
Court struck down the plan, holding that the quota rested "upon
the 'completely unrealistic' assumption that minorities will choose
a particular trade in lockstep proportion to their representation in
the local population."' 1 7
3. Title VII
In the context of employment discrimination claims under Ti-
tle VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, the courts have recognized
that a difference between the proportion of male and female work-
ers in a particular position and their proportion in the general pop-
ulation is not proof of discrimination. 118 In International Brotherhood
of Teamsters v. United States,'1 9 the Supreme Court made it clear that
discrimination is not necessarily shown by evidence of a numerical
disparity between percentages of particular groups in the em-
ployer's work force and their percentages in the general popula-
tion. Noting that Title VII "imposes no requirement that a work
force mirror the general population,"' 2 0 the Court held that "evi-
dence showing that the figures for the general population might
not accurately reflect the pool of qualified job applicants would...
be relevant." 2'
The Supreme Court also addressed this issue in Wards Cove
Packing Co. v. Atonio,122 where it held that statistical evidence show-
ing a high percentage of nonwhite workers in an employer's un-
skilled jobs and a low percentage of nonwhite workers in the same
torically discriminated against are not benign at all but rather are injurious to
otherwise innocent members of non-minority groups . ).
115. 488 U.S. 469 (1989).
116. The plan defined a "minority business enterprise" as a business at least
51% of which was owned and controlled by specific minority groups. Id. at 478.
117. Id. at 507; see also Hayes v. North State Law Enforcement Officers Assoc.,
10 F.3d 207, 216 (4th Cir. 1993) (finding police department's racially based pro-
motion practices violated Fourteenth Amendment; "[r]ather than treat all candi-
dates individually and assess their specific qualifications, the City of Charlotte has
chosen to make the color of the applicant's skin the sole relevant consideration in
choosing among qualified candidates.").
118. Like Title IX, Title VII contains a congressional admonition against
"preferential or disparate treatment to the members of one sex" based on propor-
tionality with the larger population. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(j) (1988).
119. 431 U.S. 324 (1977).
120. Id. at 339-40 n.20.
121. Id. at 340.
122. 490 U.S. 642 (1989).
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employer's skilled jobs did not establish a primafacie case of employ-
ment discrimination. The Court explained that the relevant com-
parison was "between the racial composition of the qualified
persons in the labor market and the persons holding at-issue
jobs:"12 3 "If the absence of minorities holding such skilled positions
[wa] s due to a dearth of qualified nonwhite applicants (for reasons
that are not petitioners' fault), petitioners' selection methods or
employment practices cannot be said to have had a "disparate im-
pact" on nonwhites."124 Similarly, in Watson v. Fort Worth Bank &
Trust,125 a plurality of the Court noted that:
It is completely unrealistic to assume that unlawful dis-
crimination is the sole cause of people failing to gravitate
to jobs and employers in accord with the laws of chance.
It would be equally unrealistic to suppose that employers
can eliminate, or discover and explain, the myriad of inno-
cent causes that may lead to statistical imbalances in the
composition of their work forces.' 2 6
V. CONCLUSION
Whatever merits the proportional to enrollment test may have
as a matter of social policy, the test awaits the analytical foundation
which would give it legitimacy as an implementation of Tide IX and
the Athletics Regulations under it.
123. Id. at 650.
124. Id. at 651-52.
125. 487 U.S. 977 (1988).
126. Id. at 992 (citation omitted); see also Hazelwood Sch. Dist. v. United
States, 433 U.S. 299, 308 n.13 (1977) ("[W]hen special qualifications are required
to fill particular jobs, comparisons to the general population (rather than to the
smaller group of individuals who possess the necessary qualifications) may have
little probative value."); Piva v. Xerox Corp., 654 F.2d 591, 596-97 (9th Cir. 1981)
(holding that disparity between percentage of employer's regional sales represent-
atives who were women and percentage of women in general workforce not highly
probative; no evidence that most workers would be qualified to be sales representa-
tives); Grano v. Department of Dev., 637 F.2d 1073, 1078 (6th Cir. 1980) (stating
.mere fact that a department is overwhelmingly male does not support an infer-
ence of discrimination where there are legitimate special qualifications for employ-
ment or advancement and no evidence is introduced as to the number and
availability of qualified women.").
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